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Discussion Following the Remarks of Dr. Stuart Smith
and Mr. Donald McFetridge
QUESTION, Professor King: Dr. Smith, you mentioned a memo-
randum of understanding which you look at as being an attractive path
to follow with these companies in terms of their future in Canada. What
kind of leverage have you got to have to achieve this memorandum of
understanding, or is it a totally voluntary thing? How do you get there?
ANSWER, Dr. Smith: The main lever has been government pro-
curement. Westinghouse, for instance, wanted to sell some turbines to
Ontario Hydro, if I'm not mistaken, and the agreement was that they
could do so only if they let their Hamilton, Ontario outfit have a mandate
on those particular turbines. What happened next was that the Canadian
engineers actually improved the turbines and, whereas the product life
was thought to be coming toward an end, they found a new use for them
in pipelines and things of this kind. Therefore, it became quite a success-
ful operation.
The case of Pratt & Whitney was, again, a procurement arrange-
ment with, perhaps, some grants as well. Certainly the second round of
Pratt & Whitney had some grants. Bell Helicopter was a case of both
procurement and grants.
Generally speaking, Canada has not given people exemptions, nor
has it allowed them to ignore environmental conditions, as some coun-
tries have done to get special arrangements. A memorandum of under-
standing usually involves large research grants or procurement
guarantees. Now, I can be corrected by a lot of people here that know
more than I do, but that's my understanding of the ones that have been
successful so far.
QUESTION, Professor King: On these big NATO contracts, fre-
quently the United States will sell a lot of military equipment to a coun-
try such as Canada or Australia. There is a concept involved in such
procurements, namely that of trade offset. To what extent can trade off-
sets alleviate the situation or have they already alleviated a difficult situa-
tion? Do they weigh very heavily or are they one factor amongst others?
ANSWER, Mr. McFetridge: We have used offsets quite a bit. My
problem with them is everybody else uses them also; so Canadian firms
are obliged when they try to sell to Europe to give the same kind of thing.
They have been uspd a lot by provincial governments and govern-
ment utilities. A number of companies have benefited greatly from the
use of offsets and, of course, procurement is very important, as Dr. Smith
has said. SNC, Lavalin and a number of other companies have been en-
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couraged by Hydro Quebec. This is a very good example of fostering the
development of new firms.
On the other hand, Bombardier is obliged to build subway cars in
Vermont for the New York order. Two countries can play the game. I
guess we will all play it, but I don't think there is anything to be gained
there.
QUESTION, Mr. Keon: I have always respected Don McFetridge's
work, but I think I disagree with one comment that he made about the
so-called "use it or lose it" provisions of the intellectual property
statutes.
I tend to feel that is a bit of a misnomer. The provisions allow the
Canadian government commissioner of patents to issue a license to some-
one else if you come to Canada, take out a patent and choose, for
whatever reason, not to use it there. However, you don't necessarily lose
the patent. You are only forced to give a license to someone else to try to
use it.
Now, if Canada proves to be a high-cost source with the good, well,
so much the worse for the licensee. But I don't see that the patentee
necessarily loses the patent in that sense.
QUESTION, Mr. Bradley: I have a question for Stuart Smith who
said something that I may have misinterpreted, but I found quite surpris-
ing. He said something to the effect that scientific knowledge can be le-
gitimately controlled, and I want to know if he's arguing that there is a
historic distinction between scientific knowledge and technology: is sci-
ence a free, open, nonproprietary endeavor as distinguished from tech-
nology, something that is developed, has value, and is salable? Should
these distinctions be narrowed or should they not be challenged? I hap-
pen to think they should be challenged, but I would like one clarification
or two answers to my question.
Secondly, we have spent time looking at whether Canada is an in-
terventionist, or should be more or less so, in the science and technology
and research and development areas. I would like to see some discussion
of the level of intervention in research and development; and some dis-
cussion of restrictions on transfers as a result of research and develop-
ment in the United States, including procurement, the shielding of
certain R&D and those kinds of things.
ANSWER, Dr. Smith: I'll answer your first question. You are ask-
ing for a clarification-whether I think that the distinction between sci-
ence and technology is breaking down. Yes, I am saying that it is.
You are saying we should resist it and I guess I'm saying we cannot.
This may sound like technological determinism to you. It may sound
like defeatism. When it comes to knowledge, it's the only thing that I
don't know how to reverse. When I was a kid, I always thought every-
thing could be undone, except when you found something out, because
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there is no way of pretending you never found out. I think that is what
happens with knowledge.
I just don't believe that we can reverse it. I think what we should be
doing now is coming to terms with what this means for universities, the
publication process, and the scientific interchange process, and try to do
what we call in politics, damage control.
There are parts of science and technology where what I said don't
apply, where there is still an enormously long period-maybe 100 years
in some instances, between something being discovered and any possible
application of it down the road; for example, astronomy or advances in
botany.
All I am saying is that there are some fields where that difference
between science and technology, that lag between discovery and a com-
mercially valuable application, disappears. In some cases the lag is a
negative quantity. For instance, you can make a lot of money if you have
a biotechnology company where you promise to do research and discover
something that you don't even know yet. That is how valuable some of
this knowledge can be. An advance in industrial materials, something a
crystallographer might discover about the molecular shape of certain
kinds of substances, which in the past would have been about as basic
and dull as you imagine, can be turned into an industry literally next
week.
There are crucial keys that are just being waited for. For instance,
how to deal with the brittleness in ceramics. Anything on that subject
will immediately be translated into an enormous benefit and possible up-
heaval of untold proportions in, let's say, the metals industry. We have
reached that point. Resist it? I wish we could. I think what we have got
to do is damage control at this point.
On your other point about the Americans having various ways in
which they protect their intellectual property, all I can say is they do and
they are very secretive in many ways. The importance for Canada is not
to feel so guilty when we intervene a bit, and more importantly, if we do
negotiate free trade with the United States, we better understand what
the U.S. does. It's awfully hard to be told that you have the right to bid
equally with everybody else on some type of contract if, in fact, you are
not allowed to attend the briefings and you don't have access to the re-
quired data. It's not really a level playing field as our American friends
like to tell us. All of that is grist for the negotiating mill. We have to
make sure that our negotiators understand that.
QUESTION, Mr. Fried: My question is for Dr. Smith. It should
also be for Mr. Beigie, but he's gone off so I leave it to you. We have
heard from both of you on the importance of a link between technology
and investment. I'm not yet convinced that you have taken us to the
third part of the matter, which is the trade aspect. It strikes me that the
tenor of the debate on the trade agreement, either with the United States
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or with the rest of the world, is to open trade channels; to be less of an
interventionist regarding trade rules; to have less subsidization; to have
fairness in procurement and national treatment, as defined in the GATT
since 1947; and so on.
On the other hand, both you and Mr. Beigie are arguing for a gov-
ernment role in making the economies of scale more dynamic. If, in fact,
the end result of either the bilateral or multilateral negotiations is to open
trade channels, but at the same time limit the ability of either govern-
ment to subsidize or intervene in a manner that would be defined a subsi-
dization or to leave procurement on an equal footing basis (putting aside
the defense related restrictions), is one not left with only the economy of
scale?
If in an open-border arrangement, a multinational or American par-
ent had the choice, it surely is going to choose the route of rationalization
of a branch plant rather than a world product mandate, if, in that agree-
ment, all you have done is open the border and at the same time circum-
scribe the role of government in the market. What should be done in a
bilateral or multilateral negotiation to, at the same time, limit govern-
ment's role in distorting trade flows, while opening the government's role
for technology flows, if both governments are using the same rules to
apply to both?
ANSWER, Dr. Smith: Let me put it more simply. Not to suggest
that you have elaborated unnecessarily, but I would say that the question
is how do you keep nontariff barriers and have free trade at the same
time? If you give up your nontariff barriers, then how can you talk about
a national industrial policy of some kind?
Well, my point is that it's not my idea to chase after bilateral free
trade with such enthusiasm. I would have preferred an industrial policy
using our own nontariff barriers effectively to build us up and then to
enter the contest. I hate to get in a boxing ring when I'm in rotten condi-
tion. If I know that the ring may be level, but the guy coming in against
me is going to kill me, I would prefer a little training time at the very
least. I'm not the guy running after bilateral free trade. In fact, if we
think bilateral free trade is a substitute for industrial policy or if we think
that that's going to automatically orient our industry better than any
industrial policy would have done, I don't agree. Every other small
country and, I would say even large countries like the United States,
have had to use government and non-trade barriers to get into certain
niches. We are the only country that is actually running a trade deficit in
every single high technology sector! Everybody else has at least a couple
of areas where they are running a surplus.
I was not running after bilateral free trade, but given that the Amer-
ican procurement market, including defense, is so much larger, equal ac-
cess to that might be worthwhile, even if it means we cannot have my
preferred industrial policy. But I don't believe for half a second that
there is any chance in the world that we will be given equal access in that
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sense. There is no way the United States can allow its defense depart-
ment to be that open. There is no possibility that we are going to get
access to all that data. The playing field will never be totally level in that
sense. The best we can hope for is an overall agreement with the U.S.
where we do get to keep some of our own non-trade barriers to balance
the degree to which the United States is obliged to keep us out.
So the statement coming out of the Science Council says either we
get genuine national treatment on both sides in total, or we get the right
to apply in Canada an equivalent amount of non-trade barrier protection
that the United States is maintaining for itself, and not necessarily the
identical type of protection.
In other words, if the United States says, "Okay, you protect your
jet bomber industry," that's no good to us. It's got to be where we can
use it. If we can get it, we will accept genuine national treatment. I'll
give up my hope of a national policy and agree under those circum-
stances that Mr. McFetridge and his people are right. But I don't think
we will ever get that. What I'm saying is let's make sure we don't give
away the one hope that we have of refurbishing ourselves for the future,
in exchange for access to an economy that will not be genuinely open to
US.
QUESTION, Mr. Hayhurst: Do we really have to paint a picture to
the Americans that they are our only hope? Is there not some alternative
left to us?
ANSWER, Dr. Smith: I'm wondering why we have to court some-
body that we are already so deeply involved with. The United States has
80% of our exports. I mean, how much further involved do we want to
be? What we have to start doing is figuring out how we are going to get
exports to other parts of the world. I agree with Mr. Beigie, that we
never really did make an effort on that third option. I disagree funda-
mentally with the people that wrote the portion in the Royal Commis-
sion Report saying that we tried the third option and it failed, so let's
agree that the U.S. is the only way that we can go.
I agree that the Canadian businessmen tend to think that the U.S. is
their only possible place of export, but they have got to change their
habits. They have to get out there and learn what it is like to do business
with, for example, Korea. I have been stimulating a couple of people to
create a trading company between Canada and Korea. I think there is a
good chance that it can happen. They are now trying to get some banks
and some big companies involved. That's the kind of thing that we have
to do. Get our people used to dealing with these other countries as that's
where the economic growth is.
The other thing that the Royal Commission says is Canadian busi-
nesses have to approach the other countries. Previously, Canadian busi-
nesses had to start with the U.S., and would then go elsewhere once they
have gained a certain expertise. We all know examples where that has
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happened. But often the product lines that we end up producing for the
American market are not necessarily the ones that are going to be sold in
Korea or Japan. I don't like having all of the eggs in one basket. I don't
like being so dependent on one market, and I sure don't like announcing
to my trade negotiating adversaries that I'm totally dependent upon
them before I even sit down to the negotiations!
QUESTION, Ms. McCarney: I had a question for Professor McFe-
tridge. He mentioned the whole issue of global product mandates, as
part of the package in the free-trade negotiations of a liberalized trade
negotiations in North America. If we do away with the whole concept of
NTB's and attracting foreign investment to Canada on a prospective
scale rather than looking backwards, as Stuart Smith did, what incentives
have we got? What incentives have we got left in our purse to offer to the
foreigners if we give up the NTBs; and, on its own, what has Canada got
that is going to cause a company to locate here in a free-trade arrange-
ment as opposed to the U.S., given the higher unit costs in Canada, en-
ergy costs, the less desirable proximity to market and all of the other
things that go into an investment decision?
ANSWER, Mr. McFetridge: There are a couple of people at the
University of Western Ontario, such as the Wynecots and Rick Harris,
who have made a long career out of studying the locational effect of vari-
ous trade arrangements in North America. It's high quality work done
by economists, and it predicts pretty unequivocally that there will be a
fairly significant expansion with free trade with the United States within
the Canadian manufacturing sector. We would not just be rafting logs
across the border. Southern Ontario would do handsomely, but you are
going to have trouble with Cape Breton. But don't you think we have
trouble there now?
QUESTION, Ms. McCarney: My question wasn't that. My ques-
tion did not concern the existing manufacturing facilities, and I agree
some of them will grow to great advantages assuming they have got the
capital for expansion into the bigger market. Looking prospectively at
attracting new investment to Canada from Europe or the Pacific, and
having them locate their plants in Canada for job creation, as opposed to
the United States, my question concerns whether we have entered into a
free-trade arrangement where it doesn't really matter?
ANSWER, Mr. McFetridge: We could have a much better chance
of attracting them than we do now. Obviously you have no access now,
no guaranteed access. I think you are much better to be inside the wall
where you participate in a pro rata fashion.
I think Dr. Smith's arguments are quite correct in that it's not clear
that we have hitched our wagon to a horse that is necessarily all that
healthy. There is a lot dispute about how well the U.S. economy is going
to do relative to a number of other economies, but I think the question is
why are we going to get any of the European investment? My answer
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would be that we would get a lot more than we would under the present
circumstances.
QUESTION, Ms. McCarney: Can you just tell me why?
ANSWER, Mr. McFetridge: Because we would then be inside a
North American free-trade area. Right now you invest in Canada and
you have access to something under 10% of the North American market.
COMMENT, Ms. McCarney: I would go to Texas.
COMMENT, Mr. McFetridge: You might. That's certainly true,
but your chances of going to Texas are less with a North American free-
trade arrangement. I'm not saying that you wouldn't go to Texas.
Maybe I would too. But it has to improve our circumstances. It has to
make them work.
QUESTION, Mr. Knopf: My question is addressed to Professor
McFetridge. You started off, I believe, by talking about how Canadian
government might intervene more in the area of intellectual property and
it struck me that you made many important points, but they all arguably
had more to do with competition policy than intellectual property.
As everybody here knows, we have a competition bill in second
reading and we have a copyright bill days, weeks, months, or somewhere
nearby, and a possible patent act reform. These things are all very timely
and, of course, we try and maintain a dialogue with the intellectual prop-
erty people and the competition people, to make sure that each side of
the specialty does not miss out on any important points. But it strikes
me that there are many particular goals that can be accomplished on
either competition law or intellectual property law that get you to the
same place, but in a much different way.
This metaphor has come and gone several times in the conference;
but in order to get somewhere, you have got to know where you are
going. Even though the bottom line might be the same, the prospective is
quite different. The process is quite different, the kind of expertise it has
brought to bear is quite different and the timing might be quite different.
The U.S. has a radically different kind of competition law than we
do. I suspect our intellectual property laws are much closer than our
competition laws. Given that, are you really suggesting that competition
law is the place to deal with these things, or would you rather see it dealt
with in an intellectual property law?
ANSWER, Mr. McFetridge: These are basically competition issues
that relate to the scope of the patent right. Essentially, I think, there is a
complication in that the patent is a legal monopoly granted for purposes
of providing incentive to invent. You are always looking at how good it
is. Is that incentive sufficient? That is a question that is more or less
unanswerable. But in terms of the scope of the patent rights, essentially
it is a competition policy question and that certainly is where the restric-
tions on the rights of patentee have come. It is my understanding that in
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the United States they have come from Sherman Act decisions or Clay-
ton Act decisions, so it is a competition issue.
QUESTION, Mr. Morrison: I think a good deal of the discussion of
industrial policy or state intervention assumes a fairly stable trading pol-
icy and framework, which would remain in place whatever Canada may
do in terms of either more or less intervention and subsidization of indus-
tries. But I'm not sure that is exactly the case as we approach a new
trade round. If countries generally are inclined to be more protectionist,
more interventionist, or use more subsidization approaches, I can't see
where the new trade round will go in terms of producing more opportu-
nities for finding more niches for U.S., Canadian and third country inno-
vations and marketing skills.
My question is, are we at an important juncture or are we on a fairly
stable plateau as we approach these negotiations? My personal inclina-
tion is to think we may well be at a watershed, either opening up substan-
tially new opportunities or closing down those opportunities which now
allow 80% of Canadian exports to reach the U.S. market.
ANSWER, Mr. McFetridge: Your question brings up a number of
issues and I'll comment on some of them. First, when you negotiate
elimination of tariffs, you face nontariff barriers; then you negotiate the
elimination of standard nontariff barrier quotas, but you are still con-
fronted with the less observable ones. Given that the world is not going
to change, countries are always going to try to get a leg up on each other
and subsidize exports in some way. My guess is that we will keep chas-
ing the less and less measurable distortions in trade and the attempts by
government to subsidize. It will be a costly process, but I think that it
certainly is going to occur.
I'm not sure what you mean by a stable environment. The world is
not a very stable place, and whether or not we have tariffs, I don't think
that changes very much the level of stability.
COMMENT, Mr. Morrison: I would agree with regard to tariffs.
They have been lowered substantially, but I think we are now approach-
ing a number of other issues which involve services and investments.
There is a high risk that the body of participants in the negotiations is
inclined toward the Brazilian model of protecting industries or subsi-
dizing new industries. We in the United States have our own problems in
these areas. But if we go toward more industrial and mercantilist policy
approaches, I think we will not be able to assume that we can protect the
existing openness of the system.
We may have a failed negotiation and may then have enormous
costs imposed on all of us by the resulting reaction and protectionist ac-
tivities. It seems to me that Canada has always been a key country in
dealing with these kinds of worldwide system approaches. Certainly the
United States listens to Canada. Perhaps we don't listen as much as Can-
ada would like, but we do listen a great deal on those kinds of questions.
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COMMENTS, Mr. McFetridge: Well, certainly adoption of mer-
cantilist policies, whether they relate to tariffs or other types of policies,
are a threat to the international trading system and to free trade. A lot of
people have argued that quotas are not such a bad thing, but economists
can get apoplectic about them. But temporary tariffs silence domestic
opposition among the victims of some type of change in prices interna-
tionally and they can be quite functional. Then you move to something
else that is probably less functionable, but less observable and not prohib-
ited, however, you are not necessarily better off.
Governments are going to continue to try to do these things and
they just try to do them by less and less observable and effective means.
You might end up with everybody believing that they would be better off
if we allowed quotas, temporary tariffs, or things like that. We are a long
way from any kind of a system which says that none of these things will
be allowed.
QUESTION, Mr. Sprung: I hesitate to go on with it too much
longer, but I wanted to take the opportunity to make a two-minute
speech, especially since Consumer & Corporate Affairs people are here,
and I've been after them for quite some time. I want to pick up on some
things that Stuart Smith said. He talked about the desirability of having
nationalistic capitalists in Canada and I tend to agree that we would love
to have them, but our history in Canada has been to discourage people
like this.
In 1980 I invested a lot of money in oil companies in Canada. In
1981 they brought out the national energy program and the value of my
shares dropped a considerable amount overnight, which also says some-
thing about the government as a leader picking out industrial things to
interfere in.
Another thing Dr. Smith said was that in this high technology
world, if we are used to being a branch plant dealing with natural re-
sources, how do we get from there onto a high plateau in technology?
Actually, I think we are there and the big asset that we have in Canada is
we have a very highly-educated population.
One industry that I'm familiar with can be a real winner for Can-
ada-the software industry. We write extremely good computer pro-
grams in Canada. We are right up on computer technology. The
University of Waterloo, where I come from, graduates 25% of the com-
puter science graduates in Canada, and our University ranks certainly
among the top five, if not the top three, in North America in terms of
mathematics and computer science.
We have been after the government to do a simple thing to update
the copyright law in Canada in order to get copyright protection to com-
puter programs. We have been after them and lobbying them for two
years. All of our major trading partners have done this. All it takes is a
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simple quick fix amendment, but there are a million excuses why they
don't do it.
I guess my point is this, we want to level the playing field for
Canadians. We have the educated population. We have the people with
the ideas. All we need is a government to set the proper legislative envi-
ronment and then just step back after the rules are made and let us go to
it and make our way in the world. If they would only concentrate on
providing the right environment for us to do that, then all of these other
subsidies and tax incentives to losing industries would be completely
unnecessary.
QUESTION, Mr. Jackson: I hate to see this meeting finished with-
out dealing with a question. The last question came very close to it. Dr.
Smith stated that we don't have enough national capitalistic investors in
Canada, and that is precisely the problem. But the legislation that deals
with who will be investors has not been mentioned as yet-and that is the
corporation law.
The structure of corporations which provides that investors get the
entire benefit of their investment is an out-of-date concept for Canada.
It's even out-of-date in the United States; likewise, it's out-of-date in Eu-
rope where it's been changed to allow participation of employees, unions
and communities in regard to where investments come from and the hir-
ing and firing of employees.
I wanted to ask Dr. Smith if anyone has thought about changing the
basic corporate structure so that people who will benefit from what hap-
pens to the corporations, including the members of the community, the
workers and the consumers of Canada, have some input into what corpo-
rations do and not just investors. What has happened with the way we
have corporate law arranged now is that the problems that everyone talks
about have come into this country from outside investors.
That was my question. I don't expect an answer now, because it's
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